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The government of the Republic of Korea piloted performance budgeting in select ministries in the late 1990s. 
Although the first attempts failed, the country learned from its mistakes. In 2003, the government introduced 
a broad package of public financial management reforms, which succeeded in integrating performance 
management into the budget process. The experience of performance budgeting reforms in Korea underscores the 
importance of: (i) strong support from top decision makers; (ii) customization of performance budgeting system 
to accommodate the country’s cultural and socioeconomic characteristics; and (iii) organizational restructuring 
and capacity building to support the new systems and processes. 
Korea embarked on a comprehensive perfor-
mance budgeting (PB) reform program in the 
mid-2000s after unsuccessful attempts to intro-
duce PB in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ko-
rea’s experience can offer several lessons for other 
countries. First, Korea provides a benchmark case 
of PB reform and is considered a model country 
with an effective public financial management 
(PFM) system. The country is known for its 
sound fiscal condition, with records of complete 
recovery from two recent financial crises. In par-
ticular, Korea’s reformed PB system is known for 
its effective integration into the regular budget 
process. The country’s experience has drawn 
the attention of many emerging and developing 
economies because they share similar traits: ex-
periences with economic development planning, 
frequent and regular rotation of civil servants, a 
recent transition to a democratic society, and a 
lack of capacity among civil servants. 
Second, Korea’s approach may also provide 
useful lessons for developing countries that are 
considering implementing a PB reform program 
within a short time frame. Relatively quickly, 
Korea was able to develop a comprehensive PB 
system with reasonable success. Thus, its “big 
bang” approach may offer policy lessons for other 
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countries with limited time. This approach carries 
with it benefits and risks; it can create irrevers-
ible momentum for reform, but requires huge 
resources that many countries lack. This study 
shows how PB reform was implemented as one 
component of a PFM reform package. 
Third, although PB can also be used for pro-
gram improvement, Korea adopted a PB system 
focused on resource allocation. Its PB system can 
be used as a model for other countries trying to 
develop a system focused on improving allocative 
efficiency. 
Fourth, Korea’s experience shows that techni-
cal assistance and capacity building are essential 
elements of PB reform. Few disagree with the goals 
of PB reform, but the difficulties of PB design 
and implementation have created many skeptics. 
Korea’s example illustrates how to overcome this 
skepticism with technical assistance and capacity 
building. 
Fifth, Korea did not succeed overnight; previ-
ous efforts at PB reform failed in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. In the early stages of its second 
attempt, the country still had not come up with a 
comprehensive blueprint. But through a process 
of trial and error, the Korean government devel-










































































































Korea’s PB System 
The Korean PB system consists of three different layers: 
monitoring, review, and in-depth evaluation. The monitor-
ing system, called the Performance Goal Management Sys-
tem, gives the first feedback on the performance of budget-
ary programs, drawing attention to programs that may not 
be meeting their goals. The strategic review system, or the 
Assessment of Budgetary Programs, collects comprehensive 
information on the performance of budgetary programs 
and prioritizes the programs based on their ratings.1 The 
monitoring applies to every program, and strategic reviews 
apply to one-third of all programs, every year. In contrast, 
the In-Depth Evaluation of Budgetary Programs system 
only selects a small number of programs. Figure 1 shows 
the performance budgeting system framework.
Monitoring: Performance Goal Management System
The monitoring system requires that line ministries sub-
mit annual performance plans and reports, which became 
mandatory with the enactment of the National Finance 
Act in 2006.2 Line ministries submit these reports to the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (formerly the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget), which, in turn, submits them to the 
National Audit Office. Finally, the reports are passed on to 
the National Assembly. 
The annual performance plan includes a hierarchical 
structure of the budgetary programs in each line ministry: 
their mission, strategic goals, performance goals, and project 
goals. The mission corresponds to the highest goal of each 
line ministry: strategic goals match the office-level goals; 
performance goals link to bureau-level goals; and project 
goals correspond to team-level goals. Performance indicators 
and targets are assigned to each performance and project 
goal. The annual performance plan also contains strategies 
to achieve the stated goals and an outline of outside factors 
that are expected to affect the goals. 
The monitoring system is the starting point for man-
aging the performance of budgetary programs. First, it 
helps identify redundancies and deficiencies in existing 
policy portfolios. By analyzing and developing a hierarchical 
policy structure, officials can examine whether a particu-
lar program is properly designed to serve a policy goal, or 
conversely, whether a particular policy goal is served by a 
proper policy portfolio. Second, the monitoring system 
provides a comprehensive list of performance indicators in 
relation to policy goals. The system works like a traffic signal, 
warning when the performance of budgetary programs may 
be falling short. Although it may not be able to provide suf-
ficient M&E information for decision-making purposes, the 
system serves as a platform to initiate discussion about the 
effectiveness of budgetary programs. 
The engagement of top administrators is key in utiliz-
ing this M&E information. The basic overview generated 
by the monitoring system is widely available to top deci-
sion makers and middle managers in the organization, 
to politicians in the legislature, to outside experts, and 
to civil society organizations. However, because further 
communication and information, in addition to the moni-
toring reports, are needed to make effective decisions, the 
monitoring system is best suited to internal management. 
Top decision makers within each organization can use the 
monitoring system to effectively initiate internal com-
munications and to guide their management decisions. 
So far, the annual performance plan and report from the 
Figure 1. Korea’s PB System Framework
Source: Author’s illustration.
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monitoring system serve informational purposes and have 
not been used in a systematic way.
Reviewing: Assessment of Budgetary Programs 
Of the three PB oversight layers, the review process is the 
most actively and systematically used for decision-making 
purposes. As mentioned, data from the monitoring system 
does not provide enough information to guide the central 
budget authority in decision making. At the same time, 
since In-Depth Evaluation covers only about 10 programs 
each year, its systematic impact on budget allocation is 
limited. 
The Assessment of Budgetary Programs is a review 
process consisting of a checklist developed by the central 
budget authority. The checklist contains questions on pro-
gram planning, management and results, and each question 
requires evidence. The review process usually takes about 
four months to complete, and one-third of government 
programs are evaluated every year. After the central budget 
authority issues review guidance, line ministries complete 
the checklist for their programs and submit them to the 
central budget authority with supporting evidence. The 
central budget authority then reviews the submissions and 
assigns each program a rating: effective, moderately effec-
tive, adequate, ineffective, or very ineffective.3 
Within the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the 
Fiscal Management Bureau is responsible for the review 
process. The bureau consists of nine teams that handle 
performance monitoring and management systems, ex 
ante evaluation of large social overhead capital projects 
and research and development projects, and public pri-
vate partnership programs. Each team consists of about 
10 civil servants. The performance management team 
within the bureau plays a central role in designing and 
implementing the review process. The members of the 
other teams sometimes participate in the review process, 
but their participation is not mandatory and depends on 
the decision of the bureau head. The operation of the 
monitoring and review systems is supported by the Korea 
Institute of Public Finance, a public research institute. 
The institute provides research, training, and consulting 
services to the government. The Center for Performance 
Evaluation and Management was established within the 
institute to support PB in the government. In the review 
process, the center conducts the first review of the line 
ministries’ self-assessment results. 
First review results are then submitted to the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance and disseminated to each line min-
istry. A line ministry can appeal to the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance if it does not agree with the first review results. 
The Ministry of Strategy and Finance responds to the line 
ministry’s appeal and provides feedback. If no agreement 
has been reached after two rounds of communications, a 
final face-to-face meeting is held between the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance and the line ministry, with experts 
from the Korea Institute of Public Finance or universities 
also attending.
The review results are summarized in table 1. The 
central budget authority has stipulated in the budget prepa-
ration guideline for line ministries that, in principle, at least 
a 10 percent budget cut should be considered for ineffective 
programs. The review reports are open to the public and 
available on the Web site of the central budget authority.
Program evaluation: In-Depth 
Evaluation of Budgetary Programs 
The program evaluation process seeks to measure rel-
evance, efficiency, and effectiveness. Although ad hoc 
Year Total Effective Moderately effective Adequate
Ineffective/ 
very ineffective
2005 555 (100) 28 (5.0) 100 (18.0) 340 (61.3) 87 (15.7)
2006 577 (100) 30 (5.2) 94 (16.3) 388 (67.2) 65 (11.3)
2007 585 (100) 69 (11.8) 143 (24.4) 342 (58.5) 31 (5.3)
2008 384 (100) 11 (2.9) 44 (11.5) 226 (58.9) 103 (26.8)
2009 346 (100) 5 (1.4) 14 (4.0) 257 (74.3) 70 (20.2)
2010 473 (100) 0 (0) 22 (4.7) 335 (70.8) 116 (24.5)
Source: Author’s calculation from the original data.
Note: The share of ineffective programs increased after 2007 due to stricter review standards introduced by the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance. Stricter standards were motivated by the decision of the ministry to use the review results for budget allocation.
Table 1. Summary of Self-Assessment Results by Rating (number of programs [%])
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evaluation activities previously existed in the central 
budget office to cope with major policy questions, there 
was no systematic or rigorous evaluation system prior to 
PB. Thus, the In-Depth Evaluation of Budgetary Programs 
institutionalized this type of evaluation into the PB sys-
tem.4 Every year, an evaluation panel is created for each 
of the 10 programs chosen for evaluation. Panel members 
are selected for their expertise; most come from public re-
search institutes and universities. With the support of the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance and line ministries, the 
evaluation panel collects data, conducts surveys, analyzes 
the data, and writes a report. Since many stakeholders are 
involved in any given program, the evaluation panel holds 
frequent meetings to collect feedback. The panel submits 
its completed evaluation report to the central budget 
office, which decides whether to reflect these results in 
resource allocation changes or program consolidation. The 
summaries of evaluation reports are available to the public, 
but the disclosure of full reports is not universal. This is 
because the Ministry of Strategy and Finance recognizes 
that the details of evaluation results may be sensitive for 
some stakeholders. However, there is strong pressure for 
open data in the government, and a full disclosure policy 
may be introduced in the future. 
PB system features 
The PB system in Korea has several context-specific fea-
tures. First, its focus on linking performance information 
and budget allocation is mainly driven by the fact that the 
budget authority is confined to budgeting functions, while 
the Prime Minister’s Office and other ministries perform 
general policy and personnel management. Given the 
scope of its mission, the budget authority works hard to 
use performance information in actual budget allocation, 
otherwise, it cannot justify running a performance manage-
ment system. For example, the budget authority issued the 
guideline that a budget cut of at least 10 percent could be 
imposed on the programs rated “ineffective” by the Assess-
ment of Budgetary Programs review. Second, like other PFM 
reform measures in Korea, PB is implemented mainly by 
the budget authority within the executive branch, without 
much consultation with the legislature. However, the voice 
from the legislature has become stronger, and the nature 
of PB has evolved accordingly.5 Finally, Korea’s PB focuses 
on producing useful information for decision making. In 
practice, that means applying the review process at the 
subprogram level. Since external factors are more active 
on the program level, and also because whole programs are 
too big for prioritization based on performance informa-
tion, Korea’s central budget authority conducts PB at the 
subprogram level.
Success Factors and 
Policy Implications 
The reform of public finance in Korea was dramatic, and 
achieved in a relatively short time frame.6 Important actors 
from within the administration joined academics, public 
finance experts, and international organizations to build 
consensus and resolve stakeholder concerns; eventually 
even the National Assembly played a role in improving and 
institutionalizing PB reform.7 The story of initial failure, 
followed by success, offers lessons in both persistence and 
change management. 
Trial and error 
The first lesson may be that policy failure can set the stage 
for eventual success. Initially, the Korean government was 
not convinced of the effectiveness of incorporating PB 
into the budgeting process. The Ministry of Planning and 
Budget started PB as a pilot project for a limited number of 
ministries and agencies in 1999, but failed to institutional-
ize it for decision-making purposes. Three major factors 
contributed to the demise of the pilot project: (i) lack of 
attention from high-level officials, (ii) absence of a clear-
cut way of incorporating PB into the budget process, and 
(iii) redundancy, with a similar performance management 
system in the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Despite this failure, the new government initiated an-
other attempt to introduce PB in 2003. During this second 
attempt, the redundancy issue was addressed from the start 
by clarifying that the focus of this new review process was 
on the management of the budgetary programs rather than 
overall policy management. However, the administration 
still did not know how to incorporate the review process 
into decision making. Thus, the second attempt began 
with a framework very similar to that of the first attempt: 
a monitoring system with an annual performance plan, and 
a report consisting of performance goals and indicators. 
Why did the Ministry of Planning and Budget embark 
on this second effort, considering its lack of confidence in 
PB? One answer is political pressure. The widespread sup-
port for PB from experts and academics in Korea clearly 
influenced policy makers. The reform was initiated by a 
Director General who later became Minister of Planning 
and Budget. He acknowledged that PB was included in PFM 
reforms despite the administration’s skepticism because of 
outside stakeholders’ support for PB. Another answer is the 
inclusion of PB within broader policy changes. It appears 
that policy makers worried less about PB itself because it 
was included as one component of PFM reforms: the focus 
was on the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) 
with top-down budgeting. The rationale that PB was a 
necessary accountability scheme in return for the increased 
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autonomy of the line ministries under the new top-down 
budgeting seems to have helped line ministries accept the 
extra work and new constraints brought in with the new 
system. If the policy makers’ interest had been solely on PB, 
they might have been hesitant in trying it again without a 
clear blueprint. Ironically, as a secondary and comparatively 
familiar component of the PFM reforms, PB was largely 
accepted. A third and important answer is found in the 
president’s support for the reform package. His broad en-
dorsement of the MTEF, and of PB in particular, provided 
momentum to the reform effort. The president showed his 
strong support for PB by requiring ministers to use objec-
tive performance information in their annual plans and 
reports. His insistence convinced government officials that 
there would be no turning back under his administration.
Budget ties and effective implementation 
Important to reform success was finding a way to incorpo-
rate PB into the budget decision-making process, despite 
weak interest in PB from politicians and bureaucrats. 
Although PB began with program performance goals and 
indicators, policy makers soon realized they needed to go 
even further to find new ideas and develop an action plan, 
and therefore a dedicated PB team was created within the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget. It included public officials 
and experts from the public research institute.8 Research 
was delegated to the Korea Institute of Public Finance to 
find a way to make PB reform work.
The study by the Institute of Public Finance found 
that PB needs a prioritization process to be an effective 
decision-making tool. Fortuitously, the United States had 
developed the Program Assessment Rating Tool, and the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget benchmarked this tool, 
with Korea-specific adaptations.9 By using a standardized 
checklist, each program was given a rating that was used to 
guide budget allocation. 
In developing the prioritization process, called the As-
sessment of Budgetary Programs, the Ministry of Planning 
and Budget realized it could incorporate multiple tools that 
would serve unique purposes in the review process. The 
ministry found that the annual performance plan and re-
port could be used for monitoring, and the self-assessment 
could fill the role of periodic reviews. The ministry also 
realized that the existing ad hoc program evaluation could 
be a part of the PB system, providing in-depth evaluation 
for selected programs. As a result, the Korean government 
is now equipped with a three-layer PB system. 
The introduction of PB brought about many changes.10 
First, performance information now affects budget alloca-
tion: programs with poor ratings are more likely to receive 
budget cuts. Park (2012) empirically showed a significant 
correlation between a program’s rating and the probability 
of a budget cut, although the significance and strength of 
this correlation varies over time.11 Second, performance 
information is reflected at every stage of the budget process. 
It is used by the line ministries, the central budget authority, 
and the legislature.12 The patterns of interaction may be 
changed in the future as the legislature increases its engage-
ment, but the link between performance information and 
budget allocation will likely be maintained. Third, there 
is a tendency to move away from incremental budgeting. 
Park (2012) also found that once programs are subject to 
the review process, the size of their budget changes is bigger 
compared to changes for programs that did not go through 
the review process. This suggests that budget officials be-
come more aggressive in budget adjustments when they 
have new performance information at hand.
Despite their initial skepticism, budget officials within 
the line ministries are beginning to rely on the new per-
formance information. According to a survey conducted 
by the National Assembly Budget Office, 70 percent of 
budgeting personnel in line ministries responded with 
neutral or positive answers to the question, “Are assessment 
results from Assessments of Budgetary Programs useful 
in the preparation of budget requests?” Considering their 
negative attitude toward any M&E activities imposed by 
outside stakeholders, line ministries show quite a high sat-
isfaction level with the process. Many budgeting personnel 
in line ministries indicated that the availability of assess-
ment results made their job easier, because performance 
information facilitates communication between them and 
program managers.
Not only do line ministries utilize results from self-as-
sessments in their budget formulation, but they also change 
their program management to enhance the effectiveness of 
service delivery (box 1). Although PB in Korea is still in the 
early stage, it is gaining momentum and changing program 
management within line ministries.
Implications for future reforms 
Korea’s experience offers lessons for other countries. First, 
strong support from top decision makers is crucial in draw-
ing attention of stakeholders, such as the central budget 
office and line ministries. These top decision makers 
should include those who deal with issues across minis-
tries, such as the president, prime minister and Minister 
of Finance, in order for PB to cover the entire government. 
In Korea, the support of top decision makers was crucial 
in sustaining the second attempt at PFM reform all the 
way through to the institutionalization of PB. In contrast, 
Korea’s first effort toward PFM reform failed without such 
endorsement.
Korea’s experience also underlines that cultural and ad-
ministrative aspects of the government must be considered 
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was very cautious in its implementation of PB until top 
decision makers supported the reform. 
Opportunely, the Ministry of Planning and Budget em-
braced innovations that were not in their initial blueprint. 
The ministry developed a prioritization process and found 
a way to formalize an existing in-depth evaluation process 
for budgetary use. These actions helped the PB system be-
come well integrated into the budget process and resulted 
in greater depth of performance information. In turn, the 
high stakes of budgeting and the usefulness of performance 
information have enhanced its perceived value. If reformers 
in other countries, like those in Korea, encounter pressure 
to clearly explain the use of performance information, they 
need to consider moving beyond simply reporting perfor-
mance indicators and targets and find ways to integrate 
performance information into the budget process. It may 
not be feasible for those countries to have a PB system only 
for informational purposes.
A third policy implication is that organizational 
restructuring and capacity building may be required to 
make PB reforms work. In Korea, it was not initially clear 
that capacity among officials was inadequate; their unwill-
ingness to adapt was more evident. Thus, organizational 
restructuring was implemented to overcome resistance 
from the central budget office and to empower the bud-
get offices in the line ministries.13 Since organizational 
restructuring can add confusion in the midst of the PFM 
reform process, it should be pursued with caution. When 
adopted with prudence, restructuring may increase mo-
mentum for the reform and help the organization fit the 
reformed system. 
Before, during and after the reorganization, bureau-
crats in Korea received training from the Korea Institute 
of Public Finance.14 In any scenario, capacity building 
among budget officials and program managers is an essential 
element for PB reform success. Capacity building can be 
achieved by upgrading the budget office with additional 
personnel and more authority, or by providing consulting 
services and training programs, or both. Since PB reform 
requires budget officials and program managers to have 
planning and evaluation capacity—scarce resources in many 
governments—serious effort should be put into solving the 
capacity-building issue.
Conclusion: Leadership and Change 
Perhaps the most important component of Korea’s PB 
success was effective leadership throughout the change. 
After the demise of the first reform, the Korean govern-
ment developed a vision and strategy based on several case 
studies conducted by external public research institutes, 
such as the Korea Institute of Public Finance and the Korea 
in any reform effort. In many countries that have adopted 
PB, officials face little pressure to use performance infor-
mation explicitly for budget allocation purposes, and it is 
hard to find evidence that performance information affects 
budget allocation. In such countries, M&E information is 
simply used for budget reporting—a passive form of PB. In 
Korea, bureaucratic and political culture now exerts signifi-
cant pressure on ensuring the explicit use of performance 
information. Recognizing that the right political culture is 
essential for reform, the Ministry of Planning and Budget 
Box 1. Use of Performance Information in Line 
Ministries: Pilot Project of Welfare-to-Work 
Program in the Ministry of Health and Welfare
Since 2000, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has 
been running a program designed to provide assis-
tance to unemployed low-income families. However, 
less than 3 percent of recipients were found to have 
become “economically independent” through the pro-
gram. Once such poor performance was highlighted, 
particularly after the introduction of PB, the ministry 
began to reform the program. More significantly, on 
their own initiative, ministry officials used reform strat-
egies grounded in PB. 
Originally, the assistance program was managed 
without regard for performance. Funds ranging be-
tween US$1.2 million and US$1.9 million were allo-
cated to each of 242 regional centers; there was only 
one center in each locality, and the amount of funds 
was decided by the number of dependent families. 
Thus, there was no competition among the centers, 
and flexibility was very limited. Recently, however, the 
ministry began a pilot program based on performance-
based management. The pilot created a separation 
between buyers and suppliers: the service provider 
(or assistance center) is selected based on submit-
ted proposals, and an invitation to become a service 
provider is extended to private firms as well as non-
profit organizations. The contract is now performance 
based and the ministry makes fixed payments, pro-
portional to the number of families a center serves. In 
addition, two more incentives have been introduced: 
(i) if a recipient finds a job meeting a certain standard, 
a bonus is given to the service provider; and (ii) if a 
recipient moves off the government subsidy, the pro-
vider receives an additional bonus. This reform initia-
tive aims to improve the effectiveness of service deliv-
ery. The pilot project produced remarkable results: the 
employment rate more than doubled. The pilot pro-
gram was introduced in 2008 and evaluated in 2012 
to decide whether to scale it up nationwide—due to 




Development Institute. Top administrators understood that 
PB reform would require not only administrative capacity, 
but also analytical capacity within both leading and line 
ministries. Thus they assigned to these research institutes 
the important role of supplementing and developing this 
capacity. Over time, ministries were expected to build up 
in-house capacity and knowledge regarding PB processes. 
However, due to regular rotation of positions among bu-
reaucrats, the role of the public research institutes has 
remained essential for the implementation of the PB system. 
In addition, the Korean government created a sense of 
urgency among the line ministries and scaled up the reform 
program as quickly as possible. The Ministry of Planning 
and Budget stipulated in the budget guideline that at least a 
10 percent budget cut should be considered for ineffective 
programs. This shocked line ministries into quick action. 
Another incentive for bureaucrats was public pressure. PB 
review results were made available to the public, and the 
media called attention to underperforming programs and 
agencies. This publicity motivated government officials 
to cooperate with the new system and, at the same time, 
helped the reform gain social acceptability among civil 
society organizations and citizens. 
Establishing a dedicated reform team consisting of 
budget officials and policy researchers from the public 
institutes allowed reformers to merge expertise on practical 
and theoretical issues. The team came up with innovative 
solutions to integrate performance management into the 
actual budgeting process. The public institutes hosted 
many workshops and meetings to build consensus on policy 
direction and coalition among various stakeholders, and 
also provided training and consulting services to support 
the line ministries. Communication with stakeholders is a 
key element of successful change management. To facilitate 
additional communication with line ministries, an annual 
workshop was held to collect their feedback. This feedback 
was taken into account in the following year’s PB process. 
With the enactment of the National Finance Act in 
2006, PB in Korea gained legal foundation. It continues 
to evolve through interactions with internal and external 
stakeholders.
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Notes
1. The artificial separation between budgetary and non-
budgetary programs is due to a peculiar division of labor 
between the Prime Minister’s and the central budget office. 
Despite the presidential system in Korea, the prime minister 
plays the role of governmentwide policy coordinator and 
handles performance monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of 
policies. To avoid duplication of M&E activities between 
these two government bodies, programs consisting mostly 
of salaries are considered policy programs and subject to the 
M&E system of the Prime Minister’s Office.
2. The National Finance Act was passed in December, 2006 
and became effective in January, 2007.
3. Initially the rating consisted of four categories: effective, 
moderately effective, adequate, and ineffective. In 2008, the 
“very ineffective” category was introduced to raise review 
standards.
4. There are standardized terms of reference that are cus-
tomized to each program evaluation. The core terms of 
reference include the summative and formative evaluation 
standards. 
5. The legislature can make line item changes to the budget, 
but it can only cut the budget. To increase budget size, it has 
to secure consent from the administration. The legislature 
in Korea has limited authority compared to the Congress 
in the United States.
6. This section heavily draws from Park and Choi (2013).
7. The reform itself was initiated by the administration 
without involvement of the legislature. Since the enactment 
of the National Finance Act, the legislature has become 
involved in the PB process. Line ministries are required to 
submit their annual performance plan and report to the leg-
islature. Then, the National Assembly Budget Office, which 
provides research service to the legislature, examines and 
produces reports on the line ministries’ plans and reports. 
The legislature not only exerts oversight and accountability 
pressure, but also questions the use of performance infor-
mation within the administration. 
8. The Center for Fiscal Analysis was established within 
the Korea Institute of Public Finance in 2003 to support 
the PFM reforms. Within the center, a team was dedicated 
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to PB issues, and it expanded to become the Center for 
Performance Evaluation and Management.
9. The checklist was simplified and more detailed criteria 
for assessment developed to produce consistent assessment 
results.
10. For more detailed discussions and empirical evidence, 
see Park (2012).
11. This approach may be considered questionable, because 
to fix poor performance, more funding may be needed. Poor 
performance may come from program irrelevance or from 
an implementation problem. In Korea, poor performance 
corresponds to a red signal, and cutting funding was the first 
reaction from the central budget authority. However, the 
10 percent funding cut rule has exceptions. If the program 
is important and has to be improved, then the funding cut 
is not imposed. 
12. Park (2012) examined the correlation between fund-
ing change and program ratings after controlling for other 
factors that may affect funding change. Park (2012) found 
significant correlation between them at every stage of 
budget process, although the strength and significance 
vary over time.
13. Choi and Park (2013) provide a detailed description of 
organizational restructuring in the Ministry of Planning 
and Budget. To overcome the resistance from the budget 
office, the Minister of the Ministry of Planning and Budget 
changed the name of the budget office and reduced its staff. 
He also reinforced the reform team. 
14. The Korea Institute of Public Finance developed 
training programs for public officials in line ministries. 
Participation in the training program was mandatory in the 
early stage of PB implementation. The training programs 
were gradually diversified: an online course, public forum, 
hands-on workshop, and customized onsite programs were 
delivered. 
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